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In the opening months of the First World War, a rumour spread across the United Kingdom that Russian soldiers – identified by the ‘snow on their boots’ – had landed in Scotland en route to the Western Front. Despite being relegated to history’s footnotes as a comical but meaningless episode, this article takes the rumour seriously. Unconcerned with questions of ‘truth’ (the rumour was dismissed as fantastical by late October 1914), I will argue that the real value of this story is in what it reveals about British society at the outbreak of war. The rumour emerged as the British Expeditionary Force entered its first big test of the Great War – the battle of Mons – which would result in Germany’s first great victory and resulting in thousands of casualties. As such the rumour can be interpreted as a form of ‘secular apparition’ bringing consolation to many. It was one of the ways ordinary people made sense of their newly threatening world. 
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On 9 August, five days after Britain entered the First World War, the small British Expeditionary Force (BEF) embarked for France. The 70,000 strong force arrived in France on 14 August as the Belgian army was retreating and while the French were being pushed back on the southern end of the front. By the 20 August it had arrived in its concentration zone in south Mons.​[1]​ On 22 August, the 2nd Corps of the BEF set up defensive positions along a salient formed by the Mons-Conde canal with orders to hold the German advance for twenty-four hours. At 6 a.m. the following morning, the Battle of Mons – the first engagement between British and German forces on the Western Front – began. The BEF were heavily outnumbered by their German opposition and the small British army suffered severe losses. On hearing of the withdrawal of the French Fifth Army, leaving the British troops open to certain destruction, along with the imminent fall of Namur, Sir John French – Commander-in-Chief of the BEF – ordered a strategic retreat on 24 August, to the British second line of defence. These days of retreat were characterised by fear and anxiety heightened by the sight of refugees streaming towards the coast and the sound of Germans guns edging ever closer to the British rear.​[2]​ At the Battle of Le Cateau on 26 August the German forces inflicted almost 8,000 casualties upon the British rear-guard. John French ordered an extended retreat, although he conceded, under Kitchener’s orders, to keep the BEF in contact with the French forces at the Marne which they crossed on 3 September 1914. It was the crisis of the campaign; the Germans were fighting the French at the outer reaches of Paris.
The outbreak of war had sent shockwaves through all communities in the UK.​[3]​ The opening weeks of the war were characterized by an unprecedented period of dislocation and frenetic activity. Uncertainty featured in all aspects of life. Regular soldiers were immediately mobilized and seen off at railway stations and ports across the country by distraught and anxious relatives, unsure of when they would see their loved ones again. Volunteers responded in their thousands to Kitchener’s repeated calls for men but were met with a system in utter chaos as the army’s administration sagged under the weight of volunteers in August and September 1914.​[4]​ Those who could not fight, whether owing to gender or age, tried to anchor themselves to the national cause supporting humanitarian and philanthropic efforts such as fundraising, hosting Belgian refugees, and knitting socks. In these opening weeks, contemporaries described a sense of chaos exacerbated by the lack of available news to help explain the situation. Although censorship in Britain during the war was far from repressive, the Press Bureau, established on 8 August, in cooperation with patriotic newspaper proprietors and journalists and new legislation encompassed in the Defence of the Realm Acts (DORA), did exercise a considerable measure of control to try and ensure no information useful to the enemy was published.​[5]​ Unfavourable news was passed over in silence or delayed. News of particular battles and troop movements was censored, while details of specific local regiments were rigidly suppressed. If any information was provided it was usually after the event. 
However, the system was not watertight, particularly in the opening weeks. On 30 August, Sidney Herbert, from Stonehaven, near Aberdeen, sent an urgent letter to the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener. In it he stated that the Lord Lieutenant of Kincardine had ordered a telegram to be read from the pulpit of the local Parish Church that morning stating that ‘the British Expeditionary Force had been practically cut to pieces’. He appealed to Kitchener to quell such pessimistic reports because of the impact upon the local population: ‘When I left Stonehaven knees were shaking and hearts quailed’.​[6]​ This horrific news was not confined to the Highlands. Owing to the infamous ‘Amiens Dispatch’ published in The Times on 30 August, the rumour of annihilation of the British Army spread.​[7]​ This atmosphere of panic and potential defeat prevalent amongst the British forces at Mons and the subsequent retreat across the Marne had filtered into the British civilian population.
It was precisely within these chaotic, anxious, and uncertain days, following the departure of the BEF to France, that a ‘Great Rumour’ spread across the United Kingdom that Russian troops had landed in Scotland on their way to the Western Front.​[8]​ At one of the tensest periods of the early fighting, mysterious trains were allegedly passing through English villages carrying hordes of between 10,000 to 250,000 Russians to join their British and French comrades in fighting the Germans. The cargo was identified owing to foreign accents, grey uniforms, long, shaggy beards, and above all ‘snow on their boots’, despite it being late summer. No town was left out of the saga; the rumour spread from north to south and east to west; from Aberdeen to the Isle of Wight and from Tralee in the south-west of Ireland to Folkestone on the south-east coast of England. Chronologically, the rumour first appeared in contemporary sources on 21 August reaching its peak on 1 September, before slowly fading out by October/November. Appendix I illustrates the extensive geographical spread of the rumour. It indicates where the rumour was discussed and communicated to (for example, if the rumour was discussed in a letter then the location of the writer and recipient has been included), where people believed the Russians had been in Britain, and even records fifty-seven cases where people believed they had actually seen the Russians themselves. 
	Strange stories, such as this, did not begin and end in the autumn of 1914. During the decade that preceded the outbreak of the First World War, British society was ‘awash with rumours and fears’, most of which were directed at an ‘imagined’ enemy within.​[9]​ From 1909 claims of widespread German espionage and phantom Zeppelin airships hovering above the English coastline were circulated by newspapers.​[10]​ Fears of invasion by foreign hordes had been bubbling since the mid-19th century evidenced by the popular response to publications such as William Le Queux’s The Invasion of 1910, first published in serial form in the Daily Mail in 1905.​[11]​ These fears, often expressions of contemporary anxieties about Britain’s defensive capabilities, reached boiling point following Britain’s entry into the war against Germany in August 1914.​[12]​ The war rapidly became a breeding ground for some truly outrageous stories that were believed by many, at the time, to be true. Some notable examples include the numerous atrocity myths (although it must be noted that those atrocities committed against French and Belgian civilians in the opening months of the war, whilst exaggerated, were grounded in fact); the Angel of Mons (its origins identifiable in Arthur Machen’s short story published in The London Evening News on 29 September 1914 but which transformed, over the spring of 1915, taking on a life of its own); the ‘Crucified Canadian’; and perhaps the most notorious atrocity myth of the war – the Corpse Factory – which alleged that the Germans were recycling the bodies of their own dead for use in the war effort.​[13]​ These rumours, and more, were angrily dismissed in 1928 by Arthur Ponsonby, the Liberal, later Labour MP, as the result of the unruly excesses of wartime lies and propaganda.​[14]​ 
 	It was precisely the laboratory of European war that first attracted the now renowned historian of ‘mentalities’, Marc Bloch, to the subject of rumour (fausse nouvelle). Bloch served as an infantry soldier during the war. Already fascinated by the production of misinformation and collective psychology, the war provided a unique position from which to study the dissemination of fausses nouvelles, culminating in the publication of “Réflexions d’un historien sur les fausses nouvelles de la guerre” in 1921.​[15]​ This consisted of a review of four recent studies of rumours during the Great War and the tale of the notorious reservist from Brème, a memorable event from Bloch’s time on the plateau of the Chemin des Dames in the late summer of 1917.​[16]​ He sought to apply a critical method to the production and dissemination of fausses nouvelles, whilst also using these “collective representations” to penetrate the deeper realities of the epoch in which they were created and spread. Bloch concluded that such rumours were not spontaneous occurrences. They mirrored the fearful, suspicious collective consciousness of the moment.​[17]​ Unlike Ponsonby, Bloch was not interested in the issue of truth or falsehood. Bloch regarded concerns of propaganda and lies as trivial and obvious; he wished to explore the error that was propagated as fact. What can a critical analysis of myths reveal about the culture and society that produces them? 
A number of scholars, influenced by Bloch’s methodology, have taken this question as a starting point for their own examination of rumours and myths across centuries and societies. David Blackbourn and William Christian have highlighted the value of examining localised religious apparitions in 19th century Germany and 15th century Spain, respectively, rather than explaining them ‘away’ or ignoring them entirely.​[18]​ They demonstrate that a careful reading of visionaries’ accounts placed within the context and structures of the societies in question can reveal deeper meanings and significance of these ‘supernatural’ events. Modern apparitions were commonly triggered by larger events, such as periods of wartime distress or post-war disjuncture. A link can be seen between the apparitions, political upheaval, material distress and social change. By ‘zooming in’ on a small case-study at a local level, both Blackbourn and Christian are able to draw out the larger historical patterns and meanings woven into it. 
George Lefebvre and Clay Ramsay overcome the inherent methodological difficulties of studying rumours in the past​[19]​ to demonstrate the value of studying, in detail, a rumour-fuelled panic unfolding at grass-roots level over a short period of time.​[20]​ At a moment of national crisis, such as war or revolution, rumour-mongering is mediated by strong anxieties. Because individuals are forced to close ranks in confronting a common danger, such as roaming brigands, grain-stealing bandits, or an invading foreign enemy, collective sentiments are aroused. When crisis leads to heightened emotions, the critical ability of much of the population is decreased or suspended.​[21]​ War is the quintessential situation for producing apprehension and ambiguity. Rumours have been associated with wars since earliest times; ‘the Homeric beginnings of war reporting show that Greeks before, at the time of, and after their battles – and above all in their pauses – were aware of rumours, and viewed them as a power bound up with the gods’.​[22]​ Consequently it is the ideal breeding-ground for rumour-mongering and scare-stories; ‘rumour and war are inseparable twins’.​[23]​ 
Finally, David Clarke’s work on UFO sightings provides a twentieth century example of rumours and apparitions that appeal to long-established beliefs and traditions. The UFO phenomenon is the most widespread and culturally embedded supernatural belief system to emerge in the Western world during the latter half of the twentieth century and holds much in common with the Russian rumour under examination in this article. Just as the study of UFOlogy is not the study of UFOs – there are no UFOs to study only reports of UFOs – there were no Russian soldiers making their way across Britain in August to September 1914. Therefore, in a similar methodology, this article seeks to deal with the Russian experience of 1914 in relation to the people who witnessed, discussed and reported them. It seeks to study the people who ‘saw’ them and believed in them, and the mechanisms by which the myth was promulgated in order to establish what this reveals about how British society entered the First World War.​[24]​ Half a century later, Paul Fussell returned such wartime rumours to the central arena of the experience of the war itself, seeing the Angel of Mons as part of a ‘plethora of very un-modern superstitions, talismans, wonders, miracles, relics, legends and rumours’ that emerged as a reaction to the horrors of the battlefield.​[25]​ In a sense, this article seeks to establish the Russian rumour as a similar rumour that emerged as a reaction to the chaos and uncertainty of the opening weeks of the conflict. 
Yet, in First World War studies, the rumour of Russians with ‘snow on their boots’ has either been ignored or treated as nothing more than a footnote, a comical episode amidst the horror of war. Until now, there has been no substantial examination of the rumour and what it reveals about British wartime society in the opening months of the war. Jamie H. Cockfield has utilised the myth as a tantalising title for his operational history of the Russian Expeditionary Force sent from Russia to France in 1916.​[26]​ Nigel Watson and Granville Oldroyd provide detail on the chronological evolution of the rumour in the British and American press but with no accompanying sense of what the rumour can tell us about British society in 1914.​[27]​ James Hayward gives a narrative account of the rumour but only as one amongst many wartime stories such as the Angel of Mons and the Crucified Canadian. Furthermore he seeks to uncover the ‘truth’ behind such rumours, and thus discredit them, rather than assessing them for their own value.​[28]​ 
Historical investigations should not be restricted to ‘empirically verifiable truths’ alone.​[29]​ Furthermore, ‘historians…should not seek easy amusement at the expense of historical actors, or instruct them of their errors.’​[30]​ Instead, tracing emotional reactions and perceptions provides yet another ‘window’ through which to view attitudes held in common by a wide range of people. As this article will demonstrate, the ‘Russian rumour’ resonated within British society during the opening months of the war. It did so precisely because it provided a language in which to express some of the fundamental reactions to the outbreak of the war – that of fear, particularly the fear of invasion and the fear of the unknown.​[31]​ This article thus seeks to explore what I describe as the ‘secular apparition’ of Russians with ‘snow on their boots’ that appeared in the opening months of the First World War in Britain.​[32]​ Whilst I am cautious not to overstate the similarities between the Russian rumour and religious sightings, there is value in approaching these events in a similar manner. By bringing witness testimony to the forefront of this study I can explore what the rumoured ‘sightings’ of Allied troops on British soil meant for contemporaries. I will unpack the ‘event’ itself – how and where the rumour emerged and its vectors of communication – as well as trying to draw out its larger significance. In particular, this article contributes to the historiography of rumour by illustrating that rumour can act as a positive force. Rumour is too often seen, in most societies, as a force for negativity. Yet here is an example where rumour acted as a unifying force, bringing people from all ages, classes, occupations and locations together sharing a belief in a story that inspired hope at a time of crisis. Finally, this article will demonstrate that whilst the rumour found its way into official circles it was not triggered from above. Instead, many elite figures became as embroiled in the story as members of the public and no significant efforts were made to quash or deny the rumour until mid-November.

THE ORIGINS OF THE MYTH
No evidence exists to suggest this rumour was devised at elite level and implanted in the minds of a suggestible population, susceptible to the puppetry of wartime propaganda. In fact, any explanation that seeks to write the myth off as part of a cynical process of deluding ordinary people misreads the dynamics of propaganda.​[33]​ The origins of the story are unknown despite attempts by both contemporaries and historians alike to rationalise and explain. For Austen Chamberlain, who wrote scathingly from London to his stepmother, Mary, in Birmingham on 2 September 1914, the rumour: 
appears to have originated in one or two Highland Battalions talking Gaelic which were moved from the north of Scotland. Every I hear (at second hand) of people who saw and even of people also, being linguists, talked with Russians. Such is that lying jade Rumour!​[34]​

Ponsonby attempted to understand the origins of the rumour as early as 1928. For him, possible explanations included a telegram announcing a consignment of Russian eggs; a tall bearded, individual declaring from a train window that he came from ‘Ross-shire’; and a French officer with an imperfect grasp of English who approached the Western Front demanding ‘where are ze rations’.​[35]​ According to Cockfield, the rumour began from the presence of a few Russian officers in Scotland who had arrived to take up staff positions and buy munitions.​[36]​ Other explanations circulated at the time and considered after the war, linked the rumour to a food wholesaler in London who had received a telegraph that 200,000 ‘Russians’ were being despatched via Archangel, with reference to eggs rather than soldiers. Hayward substantiates this explanation, after looking at declassified MI5 files in 1997: ‘eggs’ was in fact a code-word for troops used by pre-war German spies.​[37]​ The explanations are all speculative, and almost as fantastical as the myth itself. 

THE MYTH AT ELITE LEVEL
Whilst not implanted from ‘above’, the myth did make its way into ‘official’ circles. Politicians and naval officials did genuinely discuss the rumour, simultaneously with the rest of the population. Scotland Yard’s CID Chief Basil Thomson recalled ‘Mr Asquith saying that, from a legal and evidential point of view, nothing was ever so completely proved as the arrival of the Russians’.​[38]​ People, who perhaps should have known better, were also verifying the rumour. For example, Sir George Young was convinced of the story by Sir Courtenay Ilbert, a clerk to the House of Commons, who found the many circumstantial accounts too persuasive to reject.​[39]​ Tempting as it may be to believe that military propagandists fostered the rumour as a way of boosting morale, there is no evidence to suggest that it was deliberately implanted or fuelled from above. In a ‘note’ attached after the war, Lord Wemyss, Rear-Admiral commanding the Channel-based 12th Cruiser Squadron in 1914, suggested that the contemporary understanding was that once the rumour had got about, ‘the Government found it convenient not to contradict it’.​[40]​ Yet, more often than not, in official circles the rumour was unquestionably denied. Brigadier-General John Charteris, working as one of Haig’s intelligence staff in 1914, asked at British G.H.Q in France about the rumour ‘and was told, of course, that it was rubbish. They could not get here and would have nowhere to go, if they did’.​[41]​
The rumour was not officially denied by the Press Bureau until 15 September, when the decisive victory at the Battle of the Marne was reported. The Times published this denial, yet the story was not denied in Parliament until 18 November.​[42]​ Harold Tennant, the Under-Secretary of State for War, responded to a question from a backbench MP by flatly denying that any Russian troops had been conveyed across Britain to the Western Front. However, it is interesting to note that he added that he was unsure whether this news would ‘gratify or displease my honourable friend’ highlighting the tensions and hopes pinned on this bizarre story.​[43]​ Unsurprisingly, with such a brief statement, official denials were not always believed and these self-perpetuating stories of Russian ‘sightings’ continued into October.​[44]​ There was perhaps a conspiratorial notion of a ‘double bluff’, and Basil Thomson resolved that: ‘There was nothing to be done but let delusion burn itself out’ which it did by October.​[45]​
There is, therefore, no evidence to suggest the story was ‘planted’ in the press. The rumour was featured in some newspapers, denied by others, and ignored by the majority. On 1 September the Daily News carried two stories on the rumour.​[46]​ A week later, when a telegram from Rome gave official confirmation to the presence of 250,000 Russian troops in France, the Press Bureau neither admitted nor denied the report.​[47]​ For the Daily News this was the green-light they had been waiting for: ‘The official sanction to the publication of the above [telegram]…removes the newspaper reserve with regard to the rumours which for the last fortnight have coursed with such astonishing persistency through the length and breadth of England.​[48]​ The Times, however, did not feature the story until it was officially denied by the Press Bureau. Michael MacDonagh, a journalist for The Times who believed the rumour, rationalised why the story was absent from the very newspaper he worked for. It had to be kept secret until all the Russians had arrived safely at their destination on the Western Front.​[49]​ This lacuna added fuel to the rumour; for Thomas Hope Floyd, a schoolboy in Bolton in 1914, the very fact that it did not feature in most newspapers enhanced its very legitimacy.​[50]​
Overall it would appear that the press did not contribute significantly to the acceleration or relay of the rumour. Instead the rumour was oral and interpersonal, spread by word-of-mouth. It provided a community of shared experience (even if that experience was indirect, via a friend-of-a-friend). This is understandable in the context of 1914. With very little reliable news being printed in the newspapers, individuals were forced to close ranks in confronting a common danger – the German enemy – allowing collective sentiments, such as the Russian rumour, to be aroused.​[51]​ It was not a government induced myth nor a propaganda tool invented by a manipulative press. Although the origins of the rumour are impenetrable, it most likely started as a joke that appealed to a deep well of belief and tradition invoked in times of national crisis. It rapidly transmuted into a phenomenon that I wish to explore below. For the rest of this article I will argue that the significance of this rumour lies at the grass-roots; that amongst ordinary British people this was a genuinely believed story that was perpetuated spontaneously and spread across the United Kingdom, indiscriminate in age, gender and class. This myth provided a much-needed boost of morale to the British people at a time when their prized BEF were floundering on the western front and the German army was moving closer to the Channel coast. This real significance of this myth lies in what it tells us about how ordinary British people entered the war in 1914.

‘THE RUSSIANS HAVE LANDED’: THE MYTH SPREADS
Having established that the rumour was not a top-down implantation from above, the next section examines the rumour from the bottom-up: how the rumour spread, who it spread to, and where it spread in order to demonstrate the reach of this wartime rumour. It touched all parts of the UK, including Ireland, and weaved its way into the imaginations of people from a variety of backgrounds and ages. 
Like many rumours in the pre-internet age, it was common to learn about the rumour via hearsay and gossip rather than actually witnessing the Russian entrainment.​[52]​ However, a small number of people (fifty-seven) in the witness sample claimed to have seen the Russians themselves.​[53]​ Donald Price, a schoolboy in Greater Manchester in 1914, insisted that he had seen train loads of Russians going past his bedroom window from Warrington to Manchester in 1914.​[54]​ Similarly, Lady Haworth, a school-girl also living in Greater Manchester in 1914, recalled seeing Russian soldiers at Altrincham station:
one day I was in Altrincham swimming baths which are immediately opposite the railway station. When I came out there was a great noise of cheering and I climbed on to the seat of my bicycle so as to be high enough to look over the station wall. I was astonished to see a train going very slowly through the station crammed with soldiers wearing curious grey uniforms and with luxuriant black beards. This, I assumed, was the Russian steam roller.​[55]​

Euston Station was said to have been closed for thirty-six hours while the Czar’s soldiers detrained.​[56]​ During the week of 24 to 29 August Phillip A. Leicester, aged 27 in 1914 and living in Worcester, heard: ‘curious rumours…of troops trains passing thro [sic] Spetchley station night after night crammed with men. It was said they wore strange headgear, were heavily bearded and of foreign appearance’.​[57]​ For others it was on hearing a foreign language that alerted them to the possibility of a Russian ‘invasion’. Lydia Miller Middleton, wife of a civil servant living in Ealing, London, was recounted the story by her husband. According to a work colleague’s brother, who had seen train loads of soldiers passing through a station at night ‘he heard them talking a foreign language. Father suggested Gaelic but he said no it wasn’t that…nor was it French…Then they both (Father and the man) thought of Russian’.​[58]​ The rumour even spread to Ireland, suggesting a more unified early war experience within the United Kingdom than has previously been appreciated.​[59]​ On 28 August Helen Duffin, a young woman in Newcastle, County Down, wrote to her mother, in Belfast, how there was ‘no doubt’ that ‘a strong body of Russian troops’ had been transported from Russia, to Scotland and ‘through England by train and are now in France and probably in Ostend which is a startling move and a good one’.​[60]​ On 1 September Thomas Moylan, a Lunatic Asylum Clerk in Dublin, recorded the rumour in his diary and interpreted it as a counter-weight to German prowess on the battlefield.​[61]​ 
There are frequent references to the rumour in the correspondence between encamped soldiers in Britain and their families. Family members frequently asked their solider-sons or brothers if they had actually seen the Russians where they were stationed. On 6 September Lieutenant-Colonel Heath of the Royal Garrison Artillery, stationed in Plymouth, received a letter from his mother, in Exmouth, asking ‘Have you seen any Russians down at Plymouth? Everyone is telling everyone else how the trains have been running about full of them’.​[62]​ Charteris recorded how the rumour was in wide circulation amongst the troops in France: ‘a lot of men here have got hold of the idea – all from home letters’.​[63]​ There was a clear exchange of information between the two communities, as people desperately tried to piece the story together and validate their facts. 
The rumour ‘attacked all classes indiscriminately, and seemed even to find its most fruitful soil in sober, stolid, and otherwise truthful people’.​[64]​ According to a contemporary historian, ‘nine out of ten people who heard it [the rumour] believed the story’.​[65]​ For Lewis Gielgud, encamped in Tidworth Gennings in September 1914, there was no question that the Russian rumour was true.​[66]​ George Heenan, Private Secretary to the Inspector General of the Royal Irish Constabulary in Dublin Castle, was also convinced. On 1 September he recorded in his diary: ‘Reports are current that large numbers of Russian troops are landed at Scotland and despatched to the seat of war via London. No mention is made of this subject in any of the newspapers; all the same I believe it is true’.​[67]​ For B.M. Trefusis, an upper-class lady living in London, and many others, the rumour gained further foundation ‘when the Oceanic was sunk somewhere in the north of Scotland, it was rumoured that she was bringing all their ammunition’.​[68]​ In fact HMS Oceanic had run aground off the Shetland Islands on the 8 September owing to bad seamanship and unrelated to the hostilities. 
Polite ‘society’ and the world of politics were not unaffected by the rumour. Lady Betty Balfour’s diary entry on 2 September confirms how wide and high-up the rumour had spread. Despite the authorities denying the rumour, she had heard contrary opinions from no less than the King, her brother Arthur Balfour, and the Archbishop of Canterbury.​[69]​ However, not everyone who heard the rumour was convinced. From Paris, Lord Francis Bertie the British Ambassador to France, quickly dismissed the rumour, scolding ‘there is hardly anything that the people will not believe or invent’.​[70]​ Others did not believe the story because they did not want it to be true. For Annie Chamberlain, wife of future Conservative Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, any truth in there being 40,000 Russian troops in Salisbury Plain would mean the British troops were still waiting for back-up: ‘I hardly believe it and anyway hope its [sic] not true and that the Russians are on the other side now’.​[71]​ Others were sceptical of the story because they feared the Russians would side with the Germans once they had crossed the Channel.​[72]​
Some people accepted the story with a wry smile, conscious of being deceived.​[73]​ Winifred Tower, in London, remarked, with a heavy dose of irony, that although ‘there were some sceptics who said that a large force could not possibly be embarked at Archangel…[their] ridiculous ideas were quickly suppressed’.​[74]​ Some people, undoubtedly, would have passed on the rumour ‘tongue in cheek’, finding it an amusing distraction to the seriousness of wartime life. Others spread the story not knowing what to think. However, the evidence suggests that despite possible doubters (and jokers), the majority of people chose to believe the rumour. The author, Arthur Machen, recalled how ‘great numbers of people made up their minds that the story was true from beginning to end’.​[75]​ To question the validity of the rumour was risky. For example, Charteris heard the rumour via a fellow officer who was ‘full of stories of Russians passing through London; says his sister saw them, and when I said I didn’t believe it, retorted, “Do you mean to say my sister is a liar!” So that ended that discussion’.​[76]​ More seriously, ‘those who disbelieved…were suspected of being pro-German’.​[77]​
A rumour does not necessarily have to be a calculated, ‘implantation’ from above in order to spread. Social psychologists have identified that emotional arousal, whether due to the state of collective excitement within a society or to the trait of chronic anxiety, is essential for rumour transmission.​[78]​ Uncertainty and chaos allows for the suspension of disbelief, a denial of reality as established facts.​[79]​ Rumours are an attempt to provide structure in an uncertain situation.​[80]​ When a press service is actively withholding news, rumours spread like wildfire. Civilians have a desire to know their circumstances; when the sources from which they receive information are not functioning adequately then they tend to theorise independently and through acquaintances. As B.M. Trefusis noted in her diary on 21 August: ‘One has so little news from authentic sources, that one seizes any odd rumours with glee – crumbs to live on’.​[81]​
The rumour was most commonly spread, therefore, by word-of-mouth. Although the story traditionally had its origins with an anonymous railway porter, as depicted in Punch on 23 September, multiple vectors were involved in its transportation and dissemination.​[82]​ A classic description can be found in the diary of a young VAD cook with the Red Cross, Miss G. West, from Selsey, Gloucestershire. On 10 September she recorded:
There have been rumours for weeks that large numbers of Russian troops have been brought down from Edinborough [sic] to Portsmouth and thence to France. Several people have seen porters and station masters who have seen them go through, or have even watered their horses. The Workman of Woodchester says that boats that should have returned from Norway with wood for his sawmills have been commandeered and sent to Archangel and for what purpose if not to bring over troops? Miss Leddon has a sister – a  nun in Belgium. There have been Belgian soldiers quartered at the convent. One of the officers told her he had orders to go to the coast and guide the Russians to their ports.​[83]​

Annie Chamberlain had the story confirmed to her by a clergyman who had just returned from Norway.​[84]​ For Lady Betty Balfour the story was passed on via her friend Joan, whose cousin had just returned from serving on a British Destroyer for four weeks, sweeping the North Sea for mines. 
The more people you heard the story from, the more likely you were to believe it was true. The historian Charles Oman attached little credence to the accounts of Russians in England until he received eyewitness accounts. One friend wrote from South Gloucestershire saying that there were Russians at Avonmouth. A second wrote from the Isle of Wight that he had been watching steamers with Russians on board emerging from Southampton Water. A third wrote from Oxford that numerous troop trains, laden with Russians, had been passing through Oxford station on their way to Southampton. At this point, Oman confessed, his doubts began to waver, for all three correspondents were writing a short distance from where the Russians were supposed to have been.​[85]​ 
For Lewis Gielgud the machinery behind the rumour-mill was simpler: 
all officers admit or refuse to deny that they have official knowledge of them [the Russians]: while all denials come from or thro’ the F[oreign] O[ffice]: which only means that FO clerks obey orders!...The most definite news I have had was from a subaltern who told me he had been turned out of barracks at Bedford to give them to the Russians for a night- which seems clear enough!’​[86]​ 

The involvement of soldiers in spreading these rumours is further illustrated by Dr William Scott, a doctor with the Shropshire Yeomanry. He first became aware of the rumour on 28 August from the army ‘mess’ and by 29 August ‘news about passage of Russians through this country is confirmed from many sources’​[87]​, presumably of a military nature considering the environment he was surrounded by on a daily basis. The rumour also even reached the German enemy, perhaps deliberately. The only report by Carl Lody that British surveillance teams let through to Berlin was ‘the famous story of the Russian troops passing through England’.​[88]​
These self-perpetuating stories of Russian ‘sightings’ continued well into October 1914.​[89]​ As mentioned, the Press Bureau issued an official denial on 15 September. Unsurprisingly, with such a brief statement, official denials were not always believed. Phillip A. Leicester from Worcester recorded in his diary on 31 August 1914: ‘The rumour of the Russians is publicly and officially denied – but that denial is not believed, as the Chief Constable has received secret instructions to expect them’.​[90]​ Despite her cynicism, Winifred Towers commented at this point that ‘Everyone believed in the Russians and most people continued to do so in spite of the very decided denial of the story issued by the Press Bureau’.​[91]​ But, by November, the rumour was certainly dead amongst the populace. On 11 October John MacCunn wrote, from Aldershot, to his father, in Glasgow, saying ‘in the West I now admit that they [the Russians] never existed’.​[92]​ MacCunn was a former Assistant in the Department of History at the University of Glasgow who had enlisted in the 6th Battalion Cameroon Highlanders in 1914. His letter suggests that he had, at some point, believed the Russian myth highlighting again that even contemporary historians were willing to believe the rumour. 

ANALYSING THE RUSSIAN RUMOUR
The Russian rumour was more than simply hysteria or excitement gone too far. Although it most likely started as a joke, it quickly transmuted into a sincerely believed story that had an important function. In sociological terms, the Russian rumour was a classic example of a ‘pipe dream’, or wish, rumour. The rumour first appeared in the chaotic and uncertain period following the BEF’s departure to France (9 August) and its confirmed arrival by the Press Bureau on 18 August.​[93]​ The British population knew their men had gone to the frontlines, but did not know where or what that experience would be like. The only concrete fact was they had gone away to fight in a war of unprecedented scale. The Russian rumour therefore appeared at a point when people were looking for reassurance. To a degree, it can be understood as a compensatory myth in an unfamiliar period of indefinite separation. Rumours of Russian reinforcements at least provided people at home with a sense that their men were not fighting alone. The rumour then took on an added and more forceful level of reassurance at a frightening moment during and after the Battle of Mons (last week of August and the first week of September). At a time when the British population believed that their army had been slaughtered in France and Belgium, the rumour of Russian reinforcements passing through Britain on their way to the Western Front provided evidence of physical military support, thus giving a sense of hope and a much-needed boost to popular morale. 
During the period following the departure of the BEF to France, very little news reached the pages of the British press. What did get through talked ambiguously of casualties, retreat and the encroaching German Army. There was much to be fearful about. Not only was the lack of news fuelling rumours and stories of annihilation of the British Army in retreat, but the very victory at the Marne had forced the Germans into a ‘battle to the sea’. In other words, the Germans were edging closer and closer to Calais. It was only a mere twenty miles across the Channel to the British coast. It is precisely within this vacuum of news and atmosphere of anxiety that the Russian rumour took hold. According to Violet Clutton, a VAD nurse in London, the Russians had been landed in England simply ‘to aid the Allies in France’.​[94]​ For Reverend Denys Yonge, Vicar of Boreham in Essex, ‘the Russians are said to be in England on their way to the front. If so they will give a good account of the German[s]’.​[95]​ According to a contemporary historian, the rumour ‘was caused by the hope in those critical days that this immense surprise army from Russia would roll back to German invaders of Belgium and France’.​[96]​ The mystical nature of the myth provided inspiration for an anxious home front, unsure of where their troops were, and then hearing of the retreat of the BEF at Mons and rumours of large casualty lists.​[97]​ The only excuse Michael MacDonagh could provide for his belief in the rumour was that ‘it was a case of the wish being father to the thought’; in a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy the hope that the Russians would come to the aid of the allies, mutated into a fantasised reality.​[98]​ On hearing the rumour of Russians passing through England, Louisa Baldwin, mother of the future Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin in Stourbridge, recorded ‘inclined to believe it [the rumour] is true and hope…it is’.​[99]​ For Winifred Tower ‘the situation looked very black and we all had a bad attack of gloom, though the thought of those Russians did much to cheer us up’.​[100]​ Ultimately the rumour provided hope that the British troops would receive some much-needed support, and that this would pave the way toward an early termination of the war.​[101]​ Looking back on the Russian rumour Basil Thomson wondered ‘whether some self-effacing patriot did not circulate this story in order to put heart into his fellow-countrymen at a time when depression would have been most disastrous’.​[102]​ 
However, if this was the case then that ‘patriot’ did not take into account the demoralising impact when it was realised that the Russians were not going to be reinforcing the British troops struggling on the Western Front. The image of the bubble of Russian hope being burst is best evoked by MacDonagh: ‘London is depressed today. The flower of our fondest hope has been suddenly blighted. The Press Bureau has issued an absolute denial of the rumour’.​[103]​ Mary Chamberlain, stepmother of the Conservative MP for Birmingham West Austen Chamberlain, after reluctantly accepting that the story was indeed fabricated, added ‘It would have been such a splendid coup and was so circumstantial that it is a blow that it is all untrue. Just now one could have done with their help’.​[104]​  
The rumour clearly served a positive function. It engendered excitement and hope amongst people and served a collective purpose embroiling the population in a mysterious conspiracy. At a time when little news was reaching the home population – and what did get through was frightening and spoke of defeat and annihilation of the British Army – a rumour of allied support coming to the rescue of the retreating BEF was clearly going to thrive. The rumour was all-inclusive and contributed to a unifying, collective feeling about the British nation and its allies. This is all the more interesting when we consider that rumours often act as contributing factors to violence, prejudice and discrimination.​[105]​ Examples exist in French, German and Indian societies, amongst many others, where rumour has been seen to fuel prejudice and stereotype leading to riot situations. The rumour of Russians ‘with snow on their boots’ did exactly the opposite, promoting societal accord and shared trust in an inspirational phenomenon. As such, it serves as a compelling case-study that should encourage analysts to view rumour as more than simply a negative and destructive force. 
The function of this rumour is further evidenced by the very fact that it died out when the BEF began to be more successful in France; once it had served its purpose. This supports the view that ‘when situations marked by intense collective excitement have run their course, tension is dissipated and rumours just disappear’.​[106]​ This was precisely the case with the ‘Russian rumour’. The rumour faded away when its purpose was exhausted. Although the rumour helped to boost morale, by the second week of September the big battle at the Marne was nearly over, largely a success for the allies, although not full victory.​[107]​ The allies had halted the German invasion of France and prevented the fall of Paris. As the initial tension of the opening weeks of the war – marked by confusion, insecurity, anxiety and a thirst for news – was replaced by an acceptance of the new situation, a ‘settling down to war’, more and more people began to appreciate the absurdity of these rumours. According to Vera Brittain ‘by the time…that we started believing in Russians, England had become almost accustomed to the War’.​[108]​ 

CONCLUSION
Rumours are often treated as a footnote in the historiography of the First World War. However, once we look at these rumours from a cultural perspective an important door is opened into our understanding of how populations went to war in 1914. Belief in something, even though it does not exist, is a very powerful force in history. Rumours have historical agency and their consequences are powerful. The rumour of Russians ‘with snow on their boots’ reveals much about the way the population of the United Kingdom entered the war in 1914. 
The rumour goes some way in illustrating ordinary attitudes towards one of Britain’s main wartime allies. The rumour is an expression of how quickly Britain’s pre-war enemies became valued allies. As late as July 1914, suspicion was expressed amongst ordinary people towards Russia owing to the long-held animosity between the two nations.​[109]​ Yet once the war was engaged, a dramatic shift took place regarding peoples’ perceptions of Russia. Very quickly Russia ‘the barbarian’ became Russia ‘the saviour’. Its past wrongs were forgotten when Russia’s mass army had early victories against the Germans. The press rallied to praise Russian victories; cartoons in Punch depicted Russia as a great bear or steamroller attacking the Germans from the East whilst the French and British resisted from the West.​[110]​ The necessities of war quickly transformed past enemies into contemporary allies and the rumour was one way in which this new exaltation was communicated. Yet, it is worth noting the paradoxical imagery used to evoke the Russian ally; it was both a courageous hero and a fearsome ‘bear’, simultaneously a mass army of support troops and a wild rabble of bearded, foreign soldiers traipsing across the country. One can only imagine how these dual images played out in people’s minds; the prospect of Russian troops making their way towards Southampton en route to the Western Front was, at once, both joyous and terrifying. 
An analysis of a rumour of this sort also raises some interesting methodological issues. The Russian rumour contributes to our understanding of the relationship between top-down sources of information (such as newspapers and printed pamphlets) and bottom-up grass-roots opinion. Clearly the lines are blurred, with the rumour spreading as high-up as the King. As mentioned, the rumour was not really dealt with in the national press until it was officially denied. Consequently it cannot be argued that it was the reason why the rumour persisted. The rumour spread by word-of-mouth across the United Kingdom without the help of newspapers. Thus, any attempt to understand popular opinion must be flexible enough to take into account public behaviour, public perception (or the imaginary) as well as top-down and bottom-up discussion that circulated in the public sphere.
But the real value of this rumour lies in the way it helps us access the mentalities of people experiencing the war as it unfolded. In some ways, the Russian rumour was a secular apparition. Whilst I acknowledge that there are differences when compared with a religious sighting, the comparison is ‘revealing’. Granted, it was not a single ‘vision’ in a fixed location; limited sightings occurred across the UK. However, the real power lay in the rapidity and geographical spread of communication rather than the number of people that ‘witnessed’ the Russians. Like ripples in a pond, the rumour spread across the UK in a very short space of time, verified by interpersonal connections rather than hard evidence. As with most historical rumours, its life-span was short-lived, appearing out of a specific social context, war, naturally developing from ‘truth claims’ to finished narratives, then, as the rumour saturated the community and its purpose was served, it became a mere allusion, or metonym, to a known tale.​[111]​
Secondly, whilst the rumour was not founded in religion nor contained any overtly religious expression, it did serve a similar purpose to an apparition. At a time of uncertainty and fear, rumoured sightings of allied troops making their way to support the beleaguered BEF brought a much-needed source of consolation to the majority of the population. It is well established that apparitions usually occurred in an atmosphere of upheaval, crisis, or war.​[112]​ The outbreak of European war in 1914 was one of the biggest moments of upheaval, thus far, for the vast majority of contemporaries. Just as apparitions offered hope and fed a collective faith, the rumour of Russians ‘with snow on their boots’ gave a shared vocabulary (and imagery) that acted as a source of comfort and inspiration. The rumour surfaced not simply because people were fearful of war, although this was part of it; it was as a result of being scared of what the war would bring. It emerged at a time when people were deeply anxious about what was happening to British soldiers recently departed for France. It was then fuelled by stories of the disastrous retreat from Mons. And it gained added potency by late August, when stories of German atrocities in Belgium were rife and many ordinary people feared the same would happen on British soil if the Germans could get to Calais and beyond. Just as the Fatima events of 1917 were inspired by a common enemy, ‘communism’, the rumour of Russian troops in 1914 was an expression of fear of a marauding German enemy.​[113]​ Rather than dismissing the Russians as little more than a comical aside in the dark days of war, the significance of the rumour lies in the very fact that it is a window into the ways in which British men and women at this time made sense of their threatening world. 
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